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CONSTITUTIONAL VERSUS ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDERING IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION
AND PRIVATIZATION: REFLECTIONS ON
SOURCES OF LEGITIMATION IN THE
POST-WESTPHALIAN POLITY
Michel Rosenfeld ∗

INTRODUCTION
Legal actors are increasingly caught in a concurrent trend toward
globalization and privatization that forces them to confront a fast
growing plurality of legal regimes. 1 The trend toward globalization
displaces the center of gravity of the legal order from the traditional
Westphalian nation-state 2 to the supranational or even the global arena. 3
As a consequence of this, moreover, the unity and hierarchy of legal
norms imposed by the constitution typical of the Westphalian nationstate 4 tends to unravel, leaving legal actors at the mercy of inconsistent
and at times even contradictory legal obligations stemming from
discrepant sources of law. For example, the legal regime of the
European Union (EU) can conflict with that of an EU member-state 5 or
with the international regime issuing from the United Nations (UN), 6
∗ Justice Sydney L. Robins Professor of Human Rights and Director, Program on Global and
Comparative Constitutional Theory, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
1 See Michel Rosenfeld, Rethinking Constitutional Ordering in an Era of Legal and
Ideological Pluralism, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 415, 415 (2008).
2 The Westphalian system refers to a concept of state sovereignty based on territoriality and
the absence of a role for foreign actors within a nation’s domestic structures. See Andreas
Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth, 55 INT’L ORG. 251
(2001).
3 See id. at 415-17.
4 See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 124 (Anders Wedberg trans.,
1961).
5 See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 9, 1974,
37 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 271 (Ger.); Corte Cost.
(Constitutional Court), 27 dezembro 1973, Rac. uff. corte cost. 1973 (It.), reprinted in 2 C.M.L.R.
372, ¶ 21 (1974) (asserting a country’s right to deny supremacy to EU law contrary to its
constitution).
6 See Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat v. Council & Comm’n,
2008
E.C.R.
I-6351,
2008
ECJ
EUR-Lex
LEXIS
1954,
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005J0402:EN:HTML (holding
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and an individual citizen of an EU member-state risks facing
contradictory legal norms—or apparently similar norms interpreted in
contradictory ways—issuing respectively from her country, the EU and
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 7
On the other hand, through privatization, legal actors can escape
from the fetters of law emanating from the nation-state, and formerly
public functions subject to criteria of accountability and transparency
can become entrusted to non-governmental actors who can avail
themselves of most of the benefits of those who operate within the
private sphere. Two distinct phenomena are at play in connection with
privatization in the present context: availing oneself of non-state legal
regimes, and delegation of public functions to private actors. As an
example of the first of these, multi-national corporations can make
contracts pursuant to the lex mercatoria and thus avoid, at least in part,
regulation by nation-states or supranational or international legal
regimes. 8 Examples of the second, in contrast, include privatization of
traditional government functions, such as the running of prisons or the
conduct of certain military operations such as occurred during the war
that the United States fought starting in 2003 in Iraq. 9
The assault from above and from below on the unity and hierarchy
secured by the constitution of the traditional nation-state has led one
observer to conclude that the current expansion of legal pluralism has
produced a “global disorder of normative orders.” 10 Moreover, this
situation seems aggravated by the fact that legal pluralism is
complemented by ideological pluralism. 11 Indeed, legal pluralism
would seem much more manageable if there were a consensus on what
constitutes the common good, but no such consensus prevails today
within the bounds of most nation-states, let alone the transnational or
international community. 12 Notwithstanding the difficult challenges
UN Security Council Resolution with force of law unenforceable in EU because in violation of
EU human rights protections).
7 See Lech Garlicki, Cooperation of Courts: The Role of Supranational Jurisdictions in
Europe, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 509 (2008) (noting potential for conflict between the ECJ, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and national constitutional courts and stressing that
such conflicts have been avoided thus far because of ongoing dialogue among the courts
involved).
8 See MICHEL ROSENFELD, THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUBJECT: SELFHOOD,
CITIZENSHIP, CULTURE AND COMMUNITY 246 (2010). See generally THOMAS CARBONNEAU,
LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT (1998).
9 See PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF
GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 2-3
(2007).
10 See Neil Walker, Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global
Disorder of Normative Orders, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 373, 373 (2008).
11 See Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at 416.
12 See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996).
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that are posed as a consequence of these developments, I have argued in
previous works that cogent constitutional ordering for the postWestphalian polity is certainly conceivable and most likely possible.
Such ordering would depend on a successful integration of patterns of
convergence and of divergence and on reliance on an ideological
commitment to pluralism. Furthermore, such ordering would not yield
a unified and hierarchical system of legal norms, but rather a plural one
based on a combination of layering and segmentation of diverse legal
regimes. 13
What I will address in what follows is a different, but related
question that becomes critical in light of the apparent breakup of the
unity and hierarchical integrity of the constitutional order that prevails
in the context of the Westphalian nation-state: Is the emerging ordering
in a legal universe circumscribed by globalization and privatization
better understood as a constitutional one or as an administrative one?
Obviously, supranational legal regimes do function and can, as the
EU most notably does, enjoy a high degree of legal legitimacy. 14
Moreover, even international regimes with purported global scope are
plausibly understood as constituting legitimate legal regimes. 15
Furthermore, privatization need not result in escape from constitutional
or other public regulation. Though the public-private dichotomy is
deeply engrained in common law systems, 16 and the U.S. Constitution,
by and large, only protects fundamental rights against government
action, 17 there are certain important exceptions, including situations in
which a private party performs a “public function.” 18
Under these circumstances, the central question posed above,
whether a constitutional or an administrative paradigm better accounts
for the workings of post-Westphalian legal regimes, is both a
descriptive and a normative one. How do these regimes function? And
what accounts (or should account) for their legitimacy? As we shall see
in what follows, viewed from the perspective of the Westphalian polity,
constitutional ordering relies on different criteria of legitimacy than its
administrative counterpart. Are these respective criteria adaptable or
13
14

See ROSENFELD, supra note 8, at 243-80; Rosenfeld, supra note 1.
See PETER L. LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY: RECONCILING EUROPE AND THE
NATION-STATE 7 (2010).
15 See, e.g., Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the
International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529, 568 (1998) (arguing that the UN
Charter functions as a world constitution).
16 See VERKUIL, supra note 9, at 79.
17 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 507 (3d ed.
2006).
18 Id. at 509. In certain other countries, such as Germany, constitutional protection of
fundamental rights extend generally to transactions among private parties. See NORMAN DORSEN
ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS 896 (2d ed. 2010)
(discussing German Basic Law “third-party effect” or “Drittwirkung”).
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replaceable for the purpose of accommodating post-Westphalian legal
regimes in their full diversity and plurality? For example, many
scholars have characterized the EU as a supranational constitutional
regime, even in the absence of a formal constitution. 19 Others,
however, have regarded the EU regime as, above all, an administrative
one, 20 or as a sui generis one. 21 Do these different characterizations
matter in terms of the legitimation of the EU legal regime? Are any
better suited than the others to buttress the supremacy of EU legal
norms in the face of member-state challenges? 22
Since supranational legal regimes seem bound to provoke
significant changes in the internal workings of the national regimes that
they impact, 23 and since privatization unsettles or undermines the
traditional public-private divide, 24 the central question under
consideration affects not only the legal regimes associated with the
processes of globalization and privatization, but also the preexisting
regimes that traditionally were fully incorporated within the
Westphalian polity. Accordingly, the contrast between constitutional
and administrative ordering and the public-private division should be
examined in relation to all legal regimes, regardless of their origin or
place within the current universe of legal relations. This, in turn, calls
for a reexamination of public law and of the respective positions of
constitutional and administrative law within public law as reconceived
to meet its current challenges.
Thorough exploration of the question posed and of the numerous
issues it raises requires a major undertaking that is far beyond the scope
of this Article. My purpose here is much more modest: I seek to reflect
preliminarily on some of the most salient jurisprudential issues and
implications that arise in connection with harmonization and
19 See, e.g., KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE
MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE (2001); MIGUEL POIARES MADURO,
WE THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
CONSTITUTION 8 (1998). The EU did attempt to adopt a formal written constitution. The Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) was signed on October 29, 2004 by all the (then)
twenty-five member-states, but failed due to rejection in 2005 referenda in France and the
Netherlands. The substantive provisions of the TCE were subsequently incorporated almost
intact in the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on December 1, 2009. See DORSEN ET
AL., supra note 18, at 77.
20 See LINDSETH, supra note 14, at 1-2.
21 See Pavlos Eleftheriadis, The Idea of a European Constitution, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
1, 1 (2007).
22 See supra note 5.
23 See Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v.
Nederlandse Administratis der Belastingen, 163 E.C.R. 1, 2 C.M.L.R. 105 (1963). In upholding
the right of a Dutch citizen to sue his own country under European law, the ECJ observed: “The
[European] Community constitutes a new legal order . . . for the benefit of which the states have
limited their sovereign rights . . . and the subjects of which comprise not only the Member States
but also their nationals.” Id.
24 See VERKUIL, supra note 9, at 79-81.
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legitimation of the plurality of legal regimes in play under current
conditions. With this in mind, I will proceed as follows: Part I will
explore the conceptual underpinnings of the contrast between a
constitutional regime and an administrative one; Part II will assess how
these two regimes compare in relation to supranational entities, focusing
mainly on the EU; Part III will concentrate on the challenges posed by
privatization; and finally, Part IV will consider whether public law
ought to be reconceived in light of the preceding analysis.
I. THE CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE CONTRAST BETWEEN
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGIMES
Assertions regarding the existence of global constitutional
regimes 25 and of global administrative ones 26 require comparing the
former to the latter both in terms of functioning and of achieving and
conferring legitimacy. Moreover, as the twentieth century Westphalian
nation-state was based on a combination of constitutional and
administrative ordering, it provides a promising baseline for analysis
and comparison. Because conceptions of administrative law differ from
one legal culture to the next, 27 and because so do conceptions of the
precise boundaries between the realm of constitutional law and that of
administrative law, 28 the discussion must remain schematic. It must
draw on salient commonalities while ignoring or downplaying variants
that are unlikely to meaningfully alter the overall picture.
Stripped to its essentials, the modern constitution is supposed to be
that which the people, in whom sovereignty ultimately resides, gives
itself as a charter for self-government. Thus, the “We the People”
referred to in the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution 29 figures as both the
author and the beneficiary of the U.S. Constitution, by means of which
it binds itself through a process that approximates a social contract to
abide by its prescriptions. 30 Consistent with this, the basis for
legitimation of a constitution is contractual in nature. Just as the parties
to an ordinary legal contract, each party to a social contract—i.e., each
person who belongs to “the People”—becomes bound by the contract in
question, by virtue of her agreement to its terms. And, moreover, the
25
26

See Fassbender, supra note 15, at 616.
See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Fall 2005, at 15-17.
27 See Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth, Comparative Administrative Law: An
Introduction, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1, 18 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L.
Lindseth eds., 2010).
28 Id. at 4-5.
29 See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
30 See ROSENFELD, supra note 8, at 20.

ROSENFELD.32-6

2344

6/26/2011 4:14:12 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:6

fact of mutual agreement among all the parties involved provides the
basis for justification both of the contractual relationship among the
relevant parties and of the actual contractual terms agreed to. 31 In other
words, a social contractor is bound to the social contract because she
agreed to it, and the particular terms of that social contact are fair and
legitimate because they were freely agreed to by all those who must
abide by them.
The actual terms of a constitution can vary as do those in various
conceptions of the social contract. 32 Going back to the origins of
modern constitutions in the aftermath of the eighteenth century French
and American revolutions, two distinct types of constitutional regimes
have emerged. These are the American regime based on “checks and
balances” and the French regime predicated on representative
democracy through parliamentary rule oriented towards realization of
the “general will.” 33 At the highest level of abstraction, modern
constitutionalism boils down to three essential components: defining
and circumscribing the powers of government; adherence to the rule of
law; and protection of fundamental rights. 34 Moreover, whereas there
are important differences between presidential systems such as the
American one and parliamentary systems congruent with the traditional
French one, the combination of the three essential components of
constitutionalism require an apportionment of functions among distinct
legislative, executive, and judicial powers. The U.S. Constitution
apportions these functions among three separate and co-equal branches
of government 35 whereas in parliamentary systems there is typically no
comparable separation between the legislative and the executive
powers. 36
Furthermore, modern constitutions typically entrench
systems of representative democracy that are either unitary or federal in
nature. In a unitary system, such as that of France, the entire citizenry is
represented by a national legislature; in a federal system, such as that of
31 For an extensive discussion of the similarities and differences among the social contract, as
conceived by Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant, and the legal contract, particularly as it
emerged during the era of freedom of contract, see Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The
Relation Between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769
(1985).
32 For Locke, the social contract’s main purpose is to secure inalienable natural rights; for
Hobbes, to achieve security against violence; and, for Rousseau, to promote republican selfgovernment. See id. at 857-63.
33 For a comparison of the American and French constitutional models, see ROSENFELD,
supra note 8, at 156-63.
34 See Michel Rosenfeld, Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay Between Identity and
Diversity, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE AND LEGITIMACY 3, 3 (Michel
Rosenfeld ed., 1994).
35 See U.S. CONST. art. I (legislative powers); id. art. II (executive powers); id. art. III
(judicial powers).
36 See Bruce A. Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 664-71
(2000).
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the United States, in contrast, representation is apportioned among the
U.S. Congress and fifty state legislatures allowing for “checks and
balances” among different clusters of representative democracy. 37 In
both unitary and federal Westphalian modern nation-state constitutional
democracies, the constitutionally imposed unity and hierarchy of norms
is secured through constitutionally enshrined mechanisms regardless of
any actual division of powers or of clusters of democracy. 38
Even based on this cursory account, it becomes readily apparent
that adapting the modern constitution for supranational uses might be
highly problematic. Who corresponds to “We the People” at the
supranational level? The EU’s attempt at constitution-making that
resulted in the TCE seems particularly instructive in this respect. In the
Preamble of the July 18, 2003 draft of the TCE, the authors of the latter
were referred to as “the peoples” of the (then) twenty-five EU memberstates, whereas in the final draft of the TCE issued on July 18, 2004,
“the peoples” was replaced by the heads of state—starting
alphabetically with the King of Belgium—of the twenty-five member
states. 39 Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon, as noted by Valéry Giscard
d’Estaing, the President of the EU Constitutional Convention, is in
essence the same as the rejected constitution with only the format
changed to avoid referendums. 40 Or, in other words, the treaty in
question is in form a treaty as any other while in substance it
presumably amounts to a constitution. Even if the Treaty of Lisbon
could actually unmistakably function as a constitution, could it be
legitimated as one in the absence of an EU “people”?
Upon further consideration, the lack of a single EU people may not
be as determinative as it may seem initially. Indeed, if one probes a
little deeper into the “We the People” of the U.S. Constitution and into
social contract modeled constitutional legitimation, one notices that they
cannot live up to the initial expectations listed above. On the one hand,
the “We the People” that gave itself the 1787 U.S. Constitution was
hardly representative of the “people” as it was then, and even less so of
the American people as it is now. For one thing, the Framers of the
Constitution who met in Philadelphia in 1787—fifty-five white,
propertied men—were hardly representative of the country’s population
as a whole as it stood then. 41 Also, women and African Americans
37
38

See id. at 648-50.
In the U.S., the Constitution confers limited and enumerated powers upon the federal
government, see U.S. CONST. art. I, and guarantees the supremacy of valid federal law, see id. art.
VI, while reserving for the states all the governmental powers not conferred by it onto the federal
government, see id. amend. X.
39 See ROSENFELD, supra note 8, at 172-73, 303 n.37.
40 See La Boîte à Outils du Traité de Lisbonne, par Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, LE MONDE
(Oct. 27, 2007) (Fr.).
41 See ROSENFELD, supra note 8, at 34-35.
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were excluded from voting in state ratifying conventions, where popular
approval for the new constitution was sought. 42 Finally, because the
United States
is, to a very large extent, a country of immigration built upon the
arrival of numerous waves of immigrants coming from all corners of the
world over a span of more than two centuries, only a small fraction of
today’s American people had ancestors in the United States at the time
of the Constitution’s ratification. 43
To compound the problem, there is a fundamental disanalogy
between the social contract and an actual legal contract. In a legal
contract, all the parties involved actually agree to the same terms, and
that agreement can be in a large number of cases the ultimate basis for
the validity of the contract involved. Why does an agreement to
exchange three apples for two oranges or three oranges for two apples
constitute a valid contract? It is because the parties to it have actually
agreed to be bound by its terms. In the case of a constitution, however,
no unanimous ex ante agreement by all those to be subjected to its
prescriptions is ever likely to be possible. This is because ratification
through referenda is never likely to be unanimous, and even if it were, it
could not include the acquiescence of those yet unborn who would
nonetheless in future generations be bound by their country’s
constitution. Because of that, the social contract associated with a
constitution would have to be, at least in part, hypothetical or
counterfactual. 44 And as such, the constitution in question would be
valid and legitimate because its terms proved fair and reasonable, and
not because of any elusive fact of agreement. 45
According to Habermas, laws are legitimate if they can be
conceived as both self-imposed and binding. 46 Adapting Habermas’s
criterion for present purposes, constitutions could be deemed legitimate
if they could be counterfactually reconstructed as a social contract-like
arrangement to which a fair and reasonable person would subscribe and
by which such a person would agree to be bound. In other words, every
person involved would agree to join and be bound after determining that
the constitution under consideration would be in the mutual interests of
all those who would have to live under it. Moreover, a constitution
could be counterfactually reconstructed as binding if it would have to be
considered as being normatively compelling by any fair and reasonable
member of the polity. Thus, for example, a right against torture or

42
43
44
45
46

Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 24-25.
See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 38-39 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
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equality among the sexes would emerge as indispensable in any decent
society, and hence as fit to be made binding within all contemporary
polities.
It is clear that in this adaptation of Habermas’s criterion of legal
legitimacy, it is the normative content which is likely to become the
subject of a social contract or a consensus that is determinative, and not
the fact of entering into a contractual arrangement or of reaching a
consensus. Even if reconstruction of a constitution as self-imposed and
binding were necessary for purposes of its legitimation, however, it
would not therefore be sufficient for the purposes in question.
Furthermore, since not all constitutions are alike—and that holds also
for those constitutions that would qualify overall as being fair and
equal—there must be an additional essential component that accounts
for differentiation among constitutions. That component is what I have
elsewhere referred to as “constitutional identity,” 47 which is at once
related to and distinct from national identity in the context of the nationstate. 48 Leaving aside the differences between these two identities, they
both draw on the culture, history, traditions, and mores of the people
within the relevant nation-state.
To recapitulate: Working constitutions that can satisfy relevant
criteria of legitimacy must satisfy two sets of criteria. The first of these
are the three functional criteria identified above: definition and
limitation of the powers of government, guaranteeing adherence to the
rule of law, and protection of fundamental rights. The second set of
criteria, on the other hand, concern legitimation and they consist of a
combination of democratic validation, a sufficient measure of fairness
and reasonableness, and a sufficient foundation in the collective
constitutional and extra-constitutional identities of the members of the
relevant polity. Moreover, the first criterion of legitimation can be met
through counterfactual reconstruction, but must nonetheless have some
basis in fact. For example, as mentioned above, the “We the People”
behind the U.S. Constitution was hardly representative of the U.S.
population then, let alone now. 49 Nonetheless, one can argue that
except for its lack of equality provision (which was remedied with the
adoption of the Equal Protection Clause after the Civil War 50 ) the U.S.
Constitution should have been endorsed by the entire U.S. population.
Even if one agrees with this argument, however, it is insufficient
standing alone to satisfy the criterion of democratic validation. But if
we add that there was some historic democratic validation through the
ratification process—as flawed as it may have been—coupled with the
47
48
49
50

See ROSENFELD, supra note 8, at 10.
Id. at 11-12.
See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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fact that most contemporary U.S. citizens approve of the Constitution
and are largely quite proud of it, 51 then taken together the factual and
counterfactual bases of the argument for democratic validation can
plausibly be deemed sufficient.
For its part, the administrative regime is inextricably linked to the
need and use of a bureaucracy and of bureaucratic rule to manage the
increasingly complex, detailed and specialized interface between the
state and society, which has become characteristic since the inception of
the welfare state. 52
Bureaucratic rule need not be based on
constitutional rule. 53
The two are therefore conceptually and
functionally distinct. Bureaucratic administration is systemically rulebound, and as such, at a minimum, it converges towards
constitutionalism’s rule-of-law requirement—or, more precisely,
towards a version of the latter requirement, namely rule-through-law. 54
Indeed, for a large bureaucracy to function properly in the
apportionment of government benefits, such as the dispensation of
driving licenses or the distribution of welfare benefits, it needs to rely
on rule-based functioning for both internal reasons relating to the
viability and continuity of the bureaucratic mode of operation and
external reasons relating to regularizing and rationalizing its dealings
with those with whom it must interface.
Though not necessarily related to it, administrative regulation has
long been closely linked to constitutional rule in various major legal
cultures. 55 The relationship between administrative and constitutional
law is complex and subject to differing interpretations. It has been
characterized as “uncertain, contested and deeply essential.” 56
Moreover, the actual configuration of a given administrative system of
regulation depends on the nature of the particular constitutional regime
to which it is linked (e.g., presidential, parliamentary, federal, or

51 Louis Henkin, An Immigration Policy for a Just Society?, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1017,
1022 (1994).
52 See Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 27, at 1; see also Jürgen Habermas,
Paradigms of Law, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL EXCHANGES 13, 14-19
(Michel Rosenfeld & Andrew Arato eds., 1998) (distinguishing between the “liberal-bourgeois”
and the “social-welfare” paradigm of law, and linking the latter to the bureaucratic welfare state).
53 See Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 27, at 1 (referring to East Asia’s traditional
“centralized, hierarchical and bureaucratic rule”).
54 See Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy,
74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1338 (2001) (distinguishing between the German positivistic
Rechtsstaat or “rule-through-law” and the Anglo-American “rule of law” with its due process and
fairness components).
55 See Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 27, at 1 (contrasting the German conception of
administrative law as “concretized” constitutional law and its American counterpart as “applied”
constitutional law).
56 Id. at 2.
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unitary). 57 Also, there is a seemingly inevitable overlap between the
administrative and constitutional function.
For example, both
fundamental due process constraints and basic liberties constraints can
equally impact constitutional and administrative rule. 58
With these caveats in mind and viewed in its most general terms,
an administrative regime is supposed to play both a checking and
enabling role. On the one hand, administrative regulation is designed to
set legal limits on rapidly expanding bureaucratic power and
organization. 59 As such, in relation to bureaucratic power, the
administrative regime is the equivalent of what the constitutional regime
is in relation to the polity’s governing powers, namely its legislative and
its executive powers. On the other hand, administrative regulation
provides the legal and institutional means for state management or
supervision of increasingly specialized fields that cannot be adequately
handled without specialized expertise. 60
Moreover, this second
enabling capacity is supposed to allow for depoliticization of certain
functions through the creation of independent regulatory agencies such
as central banks. 61 By the same token, the enabling capacity in question
can also be used not to place certain specialized technical tasks above
the fray of politics, but to isolate certain powerful private interests from
the reaches of the democratic policy. In other words,
administrative law has sometimes served as a check on populist or
democratic demands by giving organized and powerful economic
interest groups a way to challenge policy. . . . Public law provisions
that are justified as a check on overarching state power can also be a
means of entrenching existing private interests. 62

Even on this brief account, it becomes apparent that the
administrative regime can at once supplement, expand and contradict
the main purposes of the constitutional regime to which it is linked.
57 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Law: Reflections on Federal
Administrative Law in Nineteenth Century America, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
supra note 27, at 37, 37-38.
58 This is dramatically illustrated in France where challenges to administrative regulations are
ultimately decided by the Council of State (Conseil D’Etat) and those to parliamentary laws by
the Constitutional Council (Conseil Constitutionnel). Thus, challenges to administrative
regulations restricting wearing the Islamic veil in public schools were adjudicated in the former,
see CONSEIL D'ETAT, ETUDE RELATIVE AUX POSSIBILITÉS JURIDIQUES D'INTERDICTION DU PORT
DU VOILE INTÉGRAL (2010), available at http://www.conseil-etat.fr/cde/node.php?articleid=2000,
while that brought against the law prohibiting wearing the Burka in public was decided in the
latter, see Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2010-613DC, Oct. 7,
2010, J.O. 18345 (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-depuis-1959/2010/2010-613-dc/
version-en-anglais.88804.html.
59 See Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 27, at 3.
60 See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 43, 58 (4th ed.
2004).
61 See Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 27, at 5.
62 Id. at 3.
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Supplementation, for example, occurs when the administrative regime
extends the relevant constitutional due process and fundamental rights
protections, in whole or in significant part, within the ambit of state run
bureaucratic rule. Expansion, on the other hand, takes place when the
administrative regime allows for the provision of a governmental
function, such as depoliticized central bank monetary policy, that the
constitutional regime is not otherwise set up to provide. 63 Finally, the
administrative regime can become inconsistent with, and even at times
in part contradict, the purposes of the constitutional regime, such as
when it enables private actors to evade democratic controls or elected
officials to avoid accountability for their decisions. 64
In the broadest terms, the constitutional regime ought to exercise
some control over its administrative counterpart to the extent that the
latter falls short regarding democratic accountability, rule of law (as
opposed to law of rules) compliance, and basic protection of
fundamental rights. At the same time, the administrative regime can
supplement the constitutional regime by spreading the latter’s
prescriptions throughout the realm of bureaucratic state action. Beyond
that, it is difficult to generalize as views concerning the particular
purpose and proper scope of constitutional regulation differ both within
polities and among them. One telling example is the U.S. controversy
over the unconstitutional delegation of powers to administrative
agencies (such that they enjoy quasi-legislative, quasi-executive, and
quasi-judicial powers) that the Constitution gives to the three federal
branches of government. 65 U.S. administrative agencies have been
characterized by critics as constituting a “fourth branch of
government,” 66 and, beyond debates concerning the proper
interpretation of the Constitution among originalists and nonoriginalists, those who embrace a narrow view of permissible delegation
have a very different view of the legitimate scope of the constitutional
regime than those who have a much broader view on the subject.
Indeed, adoption of a narrow view concerning delegation seems to go
hand in hand with an ideological stance in favor of less regulation, 67
which ultimately separates Lockean conceptions of the constitution as a
63 A constitution could of course explicitly provide for a central bank and command that it be
insulated from partisan politics. Arguably, however, from a functional standpoint, a constitution
is supposed to set mechanisms for democratically accountable policymaking, whereas
administrative regulation seems better suited to protect those areas of policymaking that require
insulation from democratic pressures in order to become optimized.
64 See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding unconstitutional as a violation of
separation of powers the U.S. Congress’s attempt to have the Comptroller General determine
program funding cuts to balance budget, which might have shielded elected representatives from
responsibility in the eyes of their constituents).
65 See generally PIERCE ET AL., supra note 60, at 35-36, 49-59.
66 Id. at 31.
67 Id. at 58.
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guarantor of the broadest possible private sphere from social-welfare
egalitarian ones, which reserve a much greater space for redistribution
through the public sphere. In short, a constitution designed to guarantee
formal protection to individual rights and markets has much less use for
pervasive state regulation than one meant to secure certain welfare
guarantees and some measure of substantive equality. 68
II. CONSTITUTION AND ADMINISTRATION AT THE
SUPRANATIONAL LEVEL
As discussed above, at least up to the present, there is no
supranational “people” and no transnational constitution that satisfies
the requirements of hierarchy and unity achieved in Westphalian nationstates. 69 On the other hand, there definitely are currently functioning
supranational administrative regimes (most notably in the EU), 70 as well
as international ones with worldwide scope, such as the WTO. 71 Given
the criteria of legitimation for constitutions on the scale of the nationstate identified in the course of the preceding discussion, 72 the three
principal problems confronting supranational constitutionalism concern:
hierarchy and unity, identity, and democracy. At least as it relates to the
element of actual endorsement of the constitution through ratification,
or otherwise, that combined with counterfactual ones lend support to the
counterfactual conclusion that the relevant constitution has been selfimposed by those bound by it. 73 Arguably, administrative regimes can
avoid or circumvent these problems. They can seemingly function
without the common glue provided by national or constitutional
identity, and they have certainly endured even in the absence of
democracy. 74 Furthermore, although administrative regimes need
hierarchy and unity to function properly much as nation-state
constitutions do, it is by no means obvious that working administrative
regimes depend on constitutional hierarchy and unity rather than on
their own administrative version of the latter. Consistent with this,
would it not be preferable from both the standpoint of a functional

68 Compare Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (holding that the U.S. Constitution
does not guarantee minimum welfare rights), with Gov’t of S. Afr. v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46
(CC) (S. Afr.) (holding that the South African Constitution provides for the right to a decent
shelter, which obligates the government to undertake positive steps towards that end).
69 See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
70 See generally LINDSETH, supra note 14 (defending the thesis that the EU legal system is
better understood as an administrative rather than a constitutional regime).
71 See Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 27, at 1-2.
72 See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
73 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
74 See Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 27, at 1.
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account and that of legitimation to conceive of supranational and
international legal regimes in administrative rather than constitutional
terms?
One scholar has answered this last question in the affirmative with
respect to the EU. As he puts it:
European governance is administrative, not constitutional. The
process of European integration has had, without doubt, profound
constitutional implications for its constituent states.
It has
. . . construct[ed] a new market-polity transcending national borders.
Nevertheless, this polity has had great difficulty being understood as
constitutional in its own right. That is, it has struggled to be seen as
the embodiment or expression of a new political community
. . . capable of self-rule through institutions historically constituted
for that purpose. Rather, in this critical regard, the EU is
fundamentally administrative, with a ruling legitimacy still
ultimately derived from the historically constituted bodies of
representative government on the national level. 75

In a nutshell, the thesis is not that the EU administrative regime is
completely self-standing, but that it functions independently at the
supranational level, with only national member-state constitutional
oversight and legitimation.
In the case of the EU, member-state input occurs at two levels that
are relevant to the present discussion: the treaty-making level (and with
the failure of the TCE, the EU is “constituted” exclusively on the basis
of treaties among the member-states); 76 and on the member-state
representation level (through its head of government on the EU
Council), which together with the EU Commission, the EU Parliament
and the ECJ add up to the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of
the EU. 77 In other cases involving international administrative regimes,
by contrast, the corresponding member-state input for the most part
occurs at the treaty-making level. 78 Moreover, before proceeding any
further, two important points bearing on the legitimation of
supranational regimes must be briefly mentioned. First, in cases such as
that of the WTO, where the equal contribution of all member-states is
largely confined to the treaty-making stage, member-state
“constitutional” input occurs only at the “constitution-making”

75
76
77
78

LINDSETH, supra note 14, at 1.
See Eleftheriadis, supra note 21, at 7, reprinted in DORSEN ET AL., supra note 18, at 78.
See id. at 80-81.
For example, in the context of the WTO, representatives of the member-states’
governments have operated on a “club” model, relying on a system of confidential negotiations
among the most powerful members. Richard B. Stewart & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, The
World Trade Organization: Multiple Dimensions of Global Administrative Law, 9 INT’L J.
CONST. L. (forthcoming 2011).
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moment. 79 Additionally, in the case of the EU, the input in question
takes place on an ongoing basis in the “constituted” administrative
regime, which is thus being poised to legitimate its operation as well as
its creation. 80 Second, the member-state input discussed here may
plausibly confer constitutional legitimacy to the EU or WTO from the
internal standpoint of that member-state’s own constitution, but that in
and of itself does not confer any constitutional legitimacy at the
supranational level (at which the EU and WTO operates). Accordingly,
if the thesis under consideration proves viable, only administrative
legitimation would be possible at the supranational level. Presumably,
that would be sufficient.
At the very least then, the constitutional legitimacy of a
functioning transnational administrative regime would depend on the
latter being based on a treaty among all of the nation-states coming
within its sweep. But, notwithstanding the failed TCE, could a treaty
ever provide sufficient constitutional legitimacy?
Upon first
impression, the answer would seem to be in the negative, as the typical
Westphalian nation-state’s constitution creates or cements internal
bonds of citizenship within a single polity whereas a typical treaty
between two traditional sovereign states, such as a treaty between
Countries A and B to guarantee the security of Country C, creates an
“external” relationship for a limited-purpose common venture. 81
Beneath the surface of this basic distinction, however, matters are
more complex. Some contemporary multilateral treaties, such as the
ECHR, involve an (external) interstate relationship in relation to a
subject matter—fundamental rights—that are typically internal. From
the standpoint of fundamental rights, the ECHR looms as a hybrid
between a treaty and (part of) a constitution: a treaty in form, but part of
a constitution in substance. On the other hand, constitutions cannot be
thought of exclusively as the purely internal expression of a polity that
coheres as a unified whole. Indeed, as globalization and transnational
79 Treaty-based international regimes are, of course, subject to further determination or
modifications through subsequent treaties among the member-states operating under the initial
treaty. Such subsequent treaties, however, amount to acts of “constitution-making” rather than
interventions within the ambit of a “constituted” legal regime. For a discussion of the possibility
for constitutional amendments to operate as functional equivalents to constitution-making, see
ROSENFELD, supra note 8, at 209.
80 In other words, in the EU member-state, “constitutional” input extends both to the “pouvoir
constituant” and to the “pouvoir constitué,” see ROSENFELD, supra note 8, at 30 (discussing the
distinction between these two powers), whereas in cases such as that of the WTO, such input only
extends to the former.
81 Treaties enjoy supremacy over the law of the states under the U.S. Constitution, see U.S.
CONST. art. VI (the “Supremacy Clause”), but to bind the citizens (as opposed to federal and state
governments) and accordingly become “internally” applicable requires that Congress pass
enabling legislation. See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (involving a treaty to
protect migratory birds’ travel to Canada followed by law of Congress prohibiting the hunting of
such birds within the U.S.).
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legal regimes become more firmly entrenched, constitutional rights tend
to become more internationalized, while concurrently, international law
becomes more constitutionalized. 82
Thus, for example, certain
countries, such as South Africa, are explicitly constitutionally
empowered to consult foreign constitutional jurisprudence in the course
of settling domestic constitutional issues, 83 whereas certain
transnational legal regimes, such as the EU (through the jurisprudence
of the ECJ), have incorporated nation-state-based constitutional
norms. 84
The fact that a constitution for a transnational legal regime may
originate in a treaty (rather than a constituent act of the relevant peoples
involved proceeding as one) may not be that significant. This would
seem especially true if the eventual supranational constitution were to
establish an altogether new constitutional model radically different from
all of the models tailored to the particularities of the nation-state. One
can imagine, for example, relations among the peoples involved, among
the included member-states, and among the multiple institutional
features deployed by the constitutional treaty, to be neither purely
vertical nor purely horizontal, neither purely external nor purely
internal. In that case, the distinction between contract and treaty would
most likely lose much of its importance for the new order, thus
eventually minimizing the relevance of whether or not a constitutional
treaty is a treaty or a constitution.
With this in mind, the treaty-constitution (or treaty bearing
sufficient functional equivalence to a partial constitution, as in the cases
of the ECHR and WTO or a full-fledged one like that of the EU) would
at a very minimum define the scope of the relevant supranational regime
and provide the latter with the requisite consent of the peoples of those
nation-states that become signatories. The scope can be one of limited
purpose, such as in the case of the WTO, which regulates trade, or a
general purpose one, such as in the case of the EU, as circumscribed by
the series of treaties culminating in that of Lisbon. The nature and
sufficiency of the consent of a nation-state signatory, on the other hand,
would depend on two key factors: the actual constitution of the
signatory state involved, and the most basic prescriptions of
constitutionalism described above. 85
Individual constitutions vary in terms of the scope of legitimate
delegations or the limitations of sovereignty through treaty-making.

82
83
84

See Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at 425.
See DORSEN ET AL., supra note 18, at 4.
See Michel Rosenfeld, Comparing Constitutional Review by the European Court of Justice
and the U.S. Supreme Court, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 618, 623-24 (2006) (noting ECJ adherence to
“constitutional traditions common to the [EU] Member States”).
85 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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Thus, as evinced by cases spanning from Solange I in 1974 86 to the
Lisbon Treaty Case in 2009, 87 the German Basic Law has been
interpreted as quite significantly restricting the scope of legitimate
delegation of sovereignty to the EU. By comparison, the French
Constitution is much less restrictive. 88 More generally, a nation-state’s
constitution could conceivably authorize delegation of virtually all or
none of its sovereignty powers to supranational regimes. Because of
this, it seems more fruitful to concentrate exclusively on the
requirements of constitutionalism.
Regarding constitutionalism, the question for the most part boils
down to whether delegation “upward” to a supranational administrative
regime can be deemed the functional equivalent to delegation
“downward” to a national administrative regime. But even if the
answer were in the affirmative, there would be a seemingly inescapable
systemic issue that would loom as insurmountable. In “downward”
delegation, administrative tendencies to operate in ways that contradict
constitutional norms can be controlled or mitigated through deployment
of the full panoply of existing constitutional powers. The same appears
highly unlikely, however, in the case of treaty-based “upward”
delegation. This is most obvious in cases in which the treaty essentially
confines signatory nation-state input to the “constitution-making”
moment. However, nation-state constitutional control is ultimately
equally problematic in cases, such as that of the EU, in which nationstate government representatives also play an ongoing role in the
“constituted” supranational administrative regime. Indeed, as the
German Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence referred to above clearly
underscores, ongoing nation-state input cannot systematically avoid
internal transgressions within the nation-state as a whole pertaining to
the latter’s separation-of-powers provisions or protection of
fundamental rights. 89 Moreover, these difficulties could not be avoided
by having the nation-state supranational input completely mirror its
internal constitutional ordering. Besides making the supranational
regime completely unwieldy, the requisite mirroring would be
altogether impossible to achieve to the extent that the multiple nationstates affected would have different constitutional orderings based their
particular identitarian requirements, which as discussed above, are
essential from the standpoint of constitutional legitimacy. 90

86 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 9, 1974, 37
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 271 (Ger.).
87 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 30, 2009, 123
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 267 (Ger.).
88 See DORSEN ET AL., supra note 18, at 111.
89 See supra notes 5, 87.
90 See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
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Another possibility would be to seek legitimation at the
supranational rather than the national level. This would call for use of
the relevant treaty and other available nation-state input as a component
part of transnational legitimation. Based on the analogy between a
treaty and a contract, signatory states would provide the factual
component (or part of it in case the supranational pact is subject to
approval by referendum within each of the signatory states) of the
requisite factual/counterfactual democratic validation that needs to be in
place before a constitutional regime can be deemed legitimate. That
would leave counterfactual democratic legitimation, legitimation based
on fairness and reasonableness, and legitimation stemming from a
shared identity to be furnished by the relevant supranational
administrative regime. 91
It seems obvious from the outset that some administrative regimes
will inevitably fail to do their part in the above-sketched legitimation
process, and that would particularly be the case for the more pervasive
and more all-purpose among administrative regimes. Just as it seems
highly improbable that an administrative regime could assume the
democratic-legitimating and identitarian-validating functions of its
constitutional counterpart within the confines of the nation-state, so too
it seems unthinkable that that a supranational all-purpose administrative
regime could successfully appropriate the aforesaid functions all to
itself. Additionally, the EU’s perennial “democratic deficit” 92 and its
difficulties in forging a common identity 93 amply illustrate this last
point.
On the other hand, the best possible case for a potential
administrative regime successful in supplanting its constitutional
counterpart arises in the context of a limited-purpose regime in which
democratic validation can be almost exclusively counterfactual and
identity concerns highly minimized. The best apparent candidate, in
this context, is a regime that is confined to administration based on
depoliticized expertise in relation to a problem that everyone affected
recognizes as crucial and wishes solved at all costs. For example, one
could imagine a rapidly spreading deadly epidemic with the potential of
wiping out all of humanity, which would prompt a worldwide concerted
effort to come up with the best possible medical response.
The very statement of this last hypothetical suggests how unlikely
it is that the above conditions could actually materialize. In real-life
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92

See supra notes 46, 48-53 and accompanying text.
See Mattias Kumm, Why Europeans Will Not Embrace Constitutional Patriotism, 6 INT’L
J. CONST. L. 117, 135 (2008); Judith Resnik, Law as Affiliation: “Foreign” Law, Democratic
Federalism, and the Sovereigntism of the Nation-State, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 33, 40 (2008).
93 See Dieter Grimm, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German
Maastrict Decision, 1 EUR. L.J. 219, 282, 292-97 (1995).
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cases of limited-purpose regimes, such as the WTO, matters are likely
to be altogether different. Although the WTO has enjoyed considerable
success in spreading trade liberalization, it has also come under fierce
attack—and not only for its “club” culture mentioned above. 94 Its
critics also blame it for its secretive decision-making and its disregard
of legitimate non-trade concerns. 95 Moreover, all of this has been
compounded by discord between developed and developing countries
and by the economic rise of countries such as China, India, and Brazil,
which are in some important respects ideologically different from the
U.S. and other developed countries. 96
Consistent with the preceding observations, it seems that it is
impossible to do away with the need for constitutional legitimation in
the supranational, largely administrative-regime-ruled arena, except
perhaps in the rarest of cases. However, even with respect to the latter,
the better view is not that administrative legitimation displaces its
constitutional counterpart, but rather that there is a complete
convergence between the two. Indeed, in the worldwide deadly
epidemic discussed above, delegation to experts seems highly justifiable
under any conceivable constitutional or administrative ordering system.
Beyond that, however, the convergence in question would be at best
partial, and hence the justification for ultimate recourse to constitutional
legitimation.
In the last analysis, supranational regimes cannot dispense with
constitutional legitimation in favor of ultimate administrative validation.
As I have detailed elsewhere, the constitutional legitimation involved
departs from its counterpart in the hierarchically ordered and unified
Westphalian nation-state. 97 Supranational constitutional legitimation
depends on harmonizing axes of convergence and divergence in a
pluralistic legal universe marked by layering and segmentation, but it
nonetheless remains constitutional, 98 and hence irreducible to any viable
conception of administrative legitimation.
III. THE IMPACT OF PRIVATIZATION ON THE NEXUS BETWEEN
CONSTITUTION AND ADMINISTRATION
As mentioned at the outset, privatization comprises two distinct
phenomena: privatization of an applicable legal regime as in the shift
from a nation-state’s commercial law to lex mercatoria for purposes of
94
95
96
97
98

See supra note 78.
See Stewart & Badin, supra note 78.
Id.
See Rosenfeld, supra note 1.
Id.
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regulating business dealings among multinational commercial
enterprises; and privatization of a traditional governmental function by
“outsourcing it” to a private entity, such as replacing a state run police
force by one operated by a private security firm. 99 Moreover, there can
be numerous shifts of power going from the public to the private realm
that, strictly speaking, do not involve privatization, but that tend to
produce effects that are largely functionally equivalent. For example,
inasmuch as a regulated private industry captures its administrative
regulators—a well-recognized risk 100 —subjection to administrative
oversight may work much like privatization. Indeed, that would occur
where administrative rules are carved out to further the narrow interests
of those meant to be regulated while shielding the latter from otherwise
applicable general legal norms adopted by a democratically accountable
legislature. Furthermore, if what amounts to roughly the functional
equivalent of privatization (and may be referred to as “indirect
privatization”) is also factored in, the potential sweep of privatization
seems very far-reaching. Indeed, even constitutional norms can be
enlisted in the quest to expand the scope of privatization. These norms
can also be lined up for the cause, both as swords and shields. Thus, on
the one hand, the U.S. constitutional ban on state aid to religious
schools prescribed by the Establishment Clause has been significantly
circumvented through the grant of state vouchers to parents with the full
knowledge that most of the latter will use the money received from the
state to pay for a religious school education for their children. 101 On the
other hand, U.S. congressional campaign financing legislation designed
to achieve a greater leveling of the playing field, fairness, and
transparency in electoral campaigns, was successfully attacked as being
in violation of the freedom of expression rights of private parties, who
use vast sums of money to vilify political candidates, thus potentially
assuming a disproportionate role in influencing electoral outcomes
while remaining legally entitled to retain their anonymity. 102
These developments call for a rethinking of the public-private
divide, which I will briefly address in Part IV below. In this Part, I will
only focus on how direct and indirect privatization is likely to affect
constitutional and administrative legitimation and the proper nexus
between the two. Before doing that, however, it is important to
99
100
101

See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
See Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 27, at 7.
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (voucher system held not to violate
Establishment Clause as parents free to choose between religious and secular private school
though in fact 94% of vouchers used for religious education).
102 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); see also STEPHEN
BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 49 (2005) (arguing
that the Supreme Court should approach the issue of campaign finance through a proportionality
analysis, balancing the state or federal regulatory program with individual free speech rights).
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emphasize two key independent points. First, privatization itself is
neither good nor bad, and whether particular instances of it ought to be
lauded or condemned often depends to a significant extent on one’s
choice among contested ideologies. Second, privatization in no way
entails “going local” or shifting power “downward” from the state to the
individual or to discrete groups or institutions operating within the
ambit of a nation-state’s civil society.
As the welfare state becomes more intrusive and its administrative
apparatus more broadly encompassing, taking charge of areas such as
education, public health, public housing, social welfare, public
transportation, etc., it seems quite likely that certain kinds (or a certain
amount) of privatization may be in the public interest. If it were beyond
dispute cheaper and more efficient to entrust mail delivery service to
private couriers than to a state-run postal service, then it would seem
that privatization would amount to an unmitigated good. In other cases,
whether to endorse or condemn privatization may turn on differences in
ideology. Thus, if privatizing a municipal transportation system would
render it cheaper and more efficient overall, but would at the same time
tend to make it prohibitively expensive for its least-well-off users, then
those who maintain that the latter’s basic necessities need to be
guaranteed by the state would be likely to oppose privatization, whereas
others, adverse to state redistributive policies, would most probably
welcome it. In contrast, where privatization would only benefit narrow
interests and would all but eliminate accountability and transparency, it
would seem logical that a large majority of the citizenry would oppose
it.
Privatization may certainly involve “going local” in certain
instances, such as when mandatory public school education gives way
to private education, 103 and perhaps eventually to homeschooling. But
in certain other cases, privatization may take place in a supranational
setting and even go hand in hand with globalization. Thus, if lex
mercatoria were chosen to govern all commercial transactions among
supranational business enterprises, or if an entire field with a global
reach, such as the Internet, opted for self-regulation under a private
regime, then privatization could conceivably occupy an entire segment
of the global legal universe.
What the consequences of privatization ought to be for
constitutional and administrative ordering depends of course on the kind
of privatization involved. In some cases, there ought to be little or no
consequences. If a state monopoly on the retail sale of liquor were
ended, allowing private businesses to take over the field, and then if a
103 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding Oregon’s mandatory
public schooling requirement violates parents’ constitutional right to chose a religious private
school for their children’s education).
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state law subsequently were to prohibit alcohol sales to minors, no
changes would be necessary to preserve the relevant status quo.
Similarly, if no such law existed, but the state liquor stores adhered to
the prohibition in question pursuant to an internally applicable
government-executive rule, then privatization would require the state to
adopt a law to the same effect to maintain the status quo. At the other
end of the spectrum, if the state were to decide to outsource its entire
existing police law enforcement functions to private businesses, then
unless extensive administrative regulation and monitoring were brought
to bear, and unless pertinent constitutional protections were extended to
private operators performing a traditional public function (or are
amended to be so extended), a major threat to fundamental rights
protection and to maintenance of the rule of law would immediately
ensue. And that threat would endanger not only the existing
constitutional order, but also compliance with the minimum
requirements of constitutionalism. 104
One may argue that, if for none other than symbolic and
identitarian reasons, certain core government functions, such as those
involving the police or the army, ought not be outsourced, as public
officials can command a certain measure of trust and accountability that
no private operator could approximate. 105 But if they were nonetheless
outsourced, the constitutional and administrative regimes ought to be
conjointly adjusted to approximate as best as possible the
accountability, transparency, fairness, and due process obligations of
public actors. Depending on the circumstances, this may be achieved
by assigning administrative functions to the appropriate private actor,
such as requiring the latter to provide the same process to those upon
whom it exercises power, as a regulatory administrative agency would
do were it in the same situation. 106 Or, it may be best achieved by
expanded administrative monitoring. In any case, the ultimate test of
legitimacy would remain compliance with constitutional ordering and
with the fundamental requirements of constitutionalism.
With respect to the second major concern, the privatization of legal
regimes, the principal challenges that it poses remarkably track those
104
105

See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
See VERKUIL, supra note 9, at 1 (“When [government sovereign] powers are delegated to
outsiders, the capacity to govern is undermined. A government appointment creates a public
servant who . . . is different from those in the private sector. The office itself is honored. . . .
Anyone who has served in government, from a buck private to a cabinet official, knows this
feeling. And they also know that the public and private sectors have different boundaries.”).
106 See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 359, 365 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting & Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court erred in not finding the privately
owned public utility company’s actions to be subject to constitutional scrutiny); Pub. Utils.
Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952) (finding the privately owned utility to be subject to
constitutional protections as the utility operated under the regulatory supervision of a public
agency).
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raised by the pluralization of legal regimes due to the proliferation of
supranational public orderings such as those framed by the UN, the
WTO, or the EU. Indeed, this becomes quite apparent if one compares
a putative purely domestic private legal regime to a supranational one.
Thus, suppose that in a purely domestic setting, state contract law
provides that a seller bears the risk of loss or damage of sold goods
prior to delivery to the buyer, but that pursuant to a private legal regime
that is used by large business firms, the risk in question is imposed on
the buyer. In that case, assuming the state law in question to be purely
facilitative (there is no public policy reason to burden commercial
sellers rather than buyers with the cost of insurance of sold goods in
transit, but only convenience as parties to contracts often fail to address
the issue at stake in their agreement) then privatization should bear no
democratic or constitutional consequences and it should not materially
impact the prevailing public-private divide. If, on the other hand, the
circumvented law is not merely facilitative but grounded on substantive
public policy choices supported by legislative majorities, such as a ban
on the sale of goods manufactured with the use of child labor, then the
private regime that would allow for circumvention of public policy
could be duly neutralized. The full arsenal of state powers under the
hierarchy and unity imposed by the state’s constitution could be brought
to bear to curb—or if necessary completely dismantle—the offending
private legal regime.
In sharp contrast, in the layered and segmented, non-unified, and
pluralistic supranational arena, a supranational private regime—and
such a regime would most certainly be a segmented one 107 —would for
all practical purposes fare exactly the same as its public law
counterparts. The problem posed by a segmented supranational public
law regime, such as the WTO, is that it can foster a conflict concerning
legal entitlements or obligations without recourse to the hierarchy of
norms or unity available in the constitutionally ruled Westphalian
nation-state. 108
The very same problem would arise with a
supranational privatized legal regime, such as the lex mercatoria, which
would likely encounter inconsistent and in part contradictory legal
regimes at both the supranational and national levels without ultimately

107 Private law regimes, as exemplified by the lex mercatoria, or by the set of private legal
norms developed to regulate certain particular fields, such as the Internet, are well adapted for
limited-purpose segmentary regulation, but not for full-purpose layered regulation, such as that
provided by the EU, as the latter lacks the concentration and commonality of interests that the
former typically has. See Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at 422-23.
108 See Armin von Bogdandy, Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say: On the
Relationship Between International and Domestic Constitutional Law, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 397,
410 (2008) (pointing out that full EU implementation of WTO free-trade regulation would result
in “reverse discrimination” within EU member-states as certain tariffs would have to be lifted
from imported goods, but not for domestic ones).
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being made accountable to any single one of them. 109 Moreover, in the
legally pluralistic supranational arena, privatized regimes are likely to
be organized like public ones; to be internally bound by norms that are
constitutional in form if not in substance, and that foster inner hierarchy
and unity. 110
In view of these strong analogies, the conclusions concerning
constitutional and administrative legitimation in the context of
globalization—namely that one cannot dispense with supranational
constitutional legitimation in favor of a largely self-legitimating
administrative regime 111 —also apply in that of privatization of legal
regimes. Also, as the previous discussion indicates, concerning
privatization in general, constitutional and administrative ordering may
require adjustment and adaptation. But constitutional legitimation,
either of a traditional kind or in line with the new realities of a layered
and segmented supranational, legally pluralistic universe, remains an
unwavering must.
IV. REVISITING THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE IN LIGHT OF
GLOBALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION
The public-private distinction has been both ever present and
unwieldy in civil law as well as in common law jurisdictions. Kelsen
found the distinction “useless” for “a general systematization of law,” 112
and Paul Verkuil has remarked that “[i]f the law is a jealous mistress,
then the public-private distinction is like a dysfunctional spouse . . . . It
has been around forever, but it continues to fail as an organizing
principle.” 113 My aim here is rather modest. I do not seek to join the
larger debate, but to concentrate exclusively on whether globalization
and privatization as discussed above require any major change in the
way we conceive the above distinction, and in particular whether they
tend to render it useless in the context of the proliferation of a plurality
of legal regimes that has become typical in the post-Westphalian era.114
109 There could be one exception to the general point under discussion in the case in which a
privatized legal regime covered the exact same segment of the legal universe as an existing public
regime, such as if there were a private regime that covered exactly the same ground as the WTO.
In such a case, the private regime could be systematically made to yield to its public counterpart.
But even in such an exceptional case, the yielding in question would not be complete unless there
were sufficient congruity between the public regime involved and the national and supranational
regimes with which it interacted.
110 See Andrea Hamann & Helene Ruiz-Fabri, Transnational Networks and Constitutionalism,
6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 481, 493-94 (2008).
111 See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
112 KELSEN, supra note 4, at 207.
113 VERKUIL, supra note 9, at 78.
114 See generally Rosenfeld, supra note 1.
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Moreover, I will approach the distinction from an exclusively
conceptual and jurisprudential standpoint, thus largely ignoring
institutional, professional and traditional concerns. 115
In the broadest terms, as Verkuil notes in reference to common law
jurisdictions, “[p]ublic law is inseparable from government. Private law
traditionally encompasses the common law of contract, torts, and
property that regulates relations among individuals.” 116 Also, consistent
with this distinction and as more systematically established in the civil
law tradition, constitutional law, administrative law, and criminal law
fall within the ambit of public law. 117 In short, at the highest levels of
abstraction, public law is the law that pertains to government—e.g.,
constitutional separation of powers or administrative procedure—or to
the relation between the government and individuals to the extent that
government imposes an obligation owed to it on individuals—e.g.,
criminal law—or directly confers a right or entitlement on the latter—
e.g., laws pertaining to government dispensation of welfare assistance to
the poor—or guarantees such individual right or entitlement—e.g.,
constitutional law both as commanding government self-restraint 118 and
as requiring positive government intervention necessary for purposes of
upholding individual rights. 119
In contrast, in its paradigmatic Lockean incarnation, the role of
government in private law would be purely facilitative. 120 Thus, the
legitimate role of contract law would ideally be limited to providing the
means of enforcing whatever bargained for agreement the competent
individual contractors had freely entered into.
Obviously, if
government departs more and more from a purely mediating role, and
replaces freedom of contract with a contract law regime replete with
directives and restrictions in the name of the public good. 121 In other
words, if contract law becomes increasingly paternalistic, then
eventually it might appear to confound or cross the line between private
and public law. For present purposes, however, suffice it that so long as

115 It may be, for example, that the public-private distinction makes less and less sense and
that it plays but an insignificant role under current conditions, but that, given its deep
embeddedness in how law, legal institutions, the teaching of law and legal practices are
organized, the costs of doing away with it would outweigh the benefits. In that case, the
distinction could remain a useful convention in spite of all its shortcomings.
116 VERKUIL, supra note 9, at 80 (footnote omitted).
117 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1350-51 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “public law”).
118 For example, constitutional law traditionally prohibits government from interfering with
citizens’ exercise of the free speech rights it grants to them.
119 For example, constitutional law may require government to provide adequate housing to
the indigent. See, e.g., Gov’t of S. Afr. v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.).
120 For further discussion of the Lockean vision, with particular emphasis on its account of
legitimate contractual relations, see Rosenfeld, supra note 31, at 866-67.
121 See id. at 889.
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law regulates interactions among individuals, whatever its substantive
terms, it will be deemed to fall within the realm of private law. 122
Consistent with the preceding observations, globalization and
privatization as such are better understood as being completely
independent from the public-private distinction as broadly recast above.
This may be counterintuitive, as the main preoccupations regarding both
globalization and privatization seem concentrated on illegitimate or
unwise transfers of sovereignty powers traditionally pertaining to
government within the bounds of the nation-state. Nevertheless, upon
reflection, the separation advocated here has several heuristic and
analytic advantages. Moreover, these advantages are easier to illustrate
in the case of globalization than in that of privatization, but are
ultimately equally availing in both cases.
The above-mentioned virtually exclusive focus on sovereignty, and
in particular on the most notorious incidents of it, such as control over
the constitution and its implementation or control over one’s borders, 123
obscures the fact that the entire legal system of the Westphalian nationstate is unified and subject to constitutional, democratic, and identitarian
constraints. Accordingly, any transfer away from that legal system to a
supranational one raises the same issues of legitimacy. 124 In theory at
least, therefore, a transfer of the making or enforcement of contract law
should raise the same legitimacy concerns as a comparable transfer in
the realm of criminal law. It is of course quite likely that—politically
and psychologically—transfer in the latter realm will be deemed much
more objectionable than will transfer in the former. To risk a prison
sentence based on legal norms adopted outside of one’s polity by
legislators with whom one does not share a common culture and over
which one has no electoral say, and to risk criminal conviction by a
foreign judge or jury, do indeed seem far worse than having to entrust
one’s contracts to foreign-crafted rules, or having one’s contract
122 This may mislead some into concluding that, under this proposed criterion criminal law
would pertain to the realm of private law. That would be unwarranted, for although criminal law
deals with certain acts among individuals, such as theft, it concerns the obligations that the
accused criminal owes to society—represented by government—on account of his alleged crime,
as opposed to his corresponding obligation to his victim. Accordingly, criminal punishment is
separate and distinct from civil liability towards one’s victim.
123 Cf. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 97-394DC, Dec. 31,
1997 (Fr.) (holding as an unconstitutional delegation of French sovereignty a treaty provision
delegating to EU control over borders among EU member-states and providing for policy making
on the subject by less than unanimous vote of EU Council). After this decision, France amended
its constitution in order to remove impediments to adherence to the EU Amsterdam Treaty. See
DORSEN ET AL., supra note 18, at 110.
124 Even if a constitution allows a particular transfer to a supranational legal regime, as did the
French Constitution through amendment in relation to the Amsterdam Treaty, see supra note 123,
this is not dispositive of the legitimacy issue. It may settle the issue formally without necessarily
doing so substantively, as it is possible that a formally sanctioned transfer would fall short of the
minimum prescriptions dictated by constitutionalism.
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disputes adjudicated by a foreign judge. But even if the consequences
be grave in the context of criminal law and light in that of contract law,
the questions of legitimacy with respect to constitutionality, democracy
and identity—i.e., why I should be subject to foreign mores and judges
rather than to those who share my culture and traditions—are the same
in both cases.
There is one case that seems to defy the above analysis, and that is
the case in which private law is purely facilitative as it would be in an
ideal Lockean freedom of contract regime. If the exclusive mission of
contract law were to insure the greatest possible freedom of contract and
the availability of contract enforcement pursuant to the relevant
contractual terms forged by the agreement of the parties, then it would
seem that the identity of the contractual facilitator would make no
palpable difference. Under these ideal conditions, contract law and its
enforcement would remain the same whether a supranational, a national
or a privatized legal regime were to dispense it. And because of this, in
substance there would be no constitutional or democratic legitimacy
issue, and any remaining identitarian issue would be at best trivial. In
other words, all constitutions would or should equally validate the ideal
contract law regime at stake, and all polities would or should
democratically enact it. 125 Finally, whereas one may prefer to have a
fellow citizen adjudicate one’s contractual disputes rather than a
foreigner, since culture and traditions would not figure in the eventual
disposition of contractual disputes, preferences based on the nationality
of the judge would be purely arbitrary.
In the end, the above case does not logically contradict the
preceding analysis. The reason it appears to is because of an
exceptional complete overlap of operative substantive norms regardless
of the legal regime involved. The question concerning constitutional,
democratic, and identitarian legitimacy does not disappear. But in this
extraordinary purely ideal case, because there are no substantive
differences, the normative prescriptions of any of the regimes identified
above can be counterfactually attributed to all the others.
These latter considerations lead to a further insight concerning the
possibility and plausible nature of supranational constitutionalism.
Whereas complete overlaps are highly improbable, significant degrees
of convergence concerning constitutional essentials, such as certain
fundamental rights, can provide the basis for constitutional legitimation
through counterfactual reconstruction. Indeed, if there is significant
convergence among corresponding constitutional norms in different
legal regimes, one can consider the norms of one of these regimes as if
125 Alternatively, the contract regime in question would be so deeply steeped in natural rights
and natural justice as to warrant a counter-majoritarian guarantee against arbitrary misuse of
democratic powers.
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they were incorporated into the others, thus fostering a certain measure
of inter-regime constitutional legitimacy. This is what happened
between the EU and Germany after Solange I, 126 as the ECJ proceeded
to incorporate the common constitutional traditions of the EU memberstates. 127 If the EU has enshrined a norm that substantively replicates a
German constitutional norm, then an EU regulation that conforms to the
enshrined norm can be construed as if it were legitimated by the
German Basic Law.
Before applying the above analysis to privatization, it is important
at the outset to note that there is an important difference for present
purposes between the latter and globalization. Whereas globalization is
in principle entirely indifferent as between public or private law,
privatization is not. Indeed, some privatizations necessarily imply a
shift from public to private law consistent with the description of these
terms given above, 128 while others do not. Suppose, for example, that a
municipality decides to privatize a public transportation system it has
operated for years and that after effectuating the transfer to private
enterprises, it neither operates nor regulates the now deregulated
business that has become subject only to the set of laws that are
applicable to all private businesses. Before the privatization, the
transportation system was legally structured as a relationship between
the government and individuals; after the privatization, it was structured
only as a relationship between individuals. Suppose now, on the other
hand, that the government privatizes all prisons, but continues to run the
existing criminal law system, to send prisoners to the now privatized
prisons, to determine for how long, to decide whether or not to grant
them parole, etc. In this latter case, privatization does not imply any
shift to private law as defined above since all resulting legal
relationships are in substance between government and individuals.
The relationship between the private prison personnel and the prisoner
may appear to be one among individuals, but in substance, the former
relate to the latter in the role of agents of, or proxies for, the
government.
How the metaphoric social contract that sets a constitution should
apportion areas of legal interaction between government and individuals
as against areas in which the government role is confined to providing
and enforcing laws designed to mediate interaction among individuals
depends on many different factors. What matters here is that it would
be inappropriate consistent with the canons of constitutionalism and of
rational governability to either reduce all legal interaction to the vertical
126 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 9, 1974, 37
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 271 (Ger.).
127 See DORSEN ET AL., supra note 18, at 89-90.
128 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
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government-individual mode, by, for example, instituting an ironclad
state monopoly over all means of production, or to confine all legal
relations to horizontal individual to individual to individual ones, thus,
for example, making military and police protection exclusively
dependent on private contractual arrangements.
Wherever the line is drawn, however, there is likely to be room for
constitutionally sanctioned discretion where privatization can go hand
in hand with transition to private law, and government assumption of
responsibility for formerly private services can bring about a change
from a private to a public law regime for the services at stake. Outside
this zone of discretion though, privatization like globalization remains
subject to the same constitutional, democratic and identitarian criteria of
legitimacy.
CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis suggests that the profound changes brought
about by globalization and privatization and by the consequent
proliferation of legal pluralism and the spread of supranational and
privatized layered and segmented legal regimes poses a series of
difficult new problems, but does not, at least in the first instance, call
for a substitution of constitutional ordering by its administrative
counterpart or for a redrawing of the public-private divide. What is
needed instead is a reconceptualization and adaptation of existing
concepts. Constitutional ordering and legitimation cannot be dispensed
with at the supranational level, but, by the same token, they cannot
simply be transported from their nation-state matrix and be redeployed
pretty much intact in a new supranational setting. What is needed is the
discovery and articulation of functional equivalents that would track the
relationship between constitutional and administrative ordering and the
public-private divide as broadly depicted above. Moreover, these
functional equivalents may well take on very different forms than their
nation-state anchored counterparts.
The reflections undertaken above have been preliminary and they
call for much more comprehensive and detailed further examination.
Because of this, it is imperative to emphasize that the claim that present
concepts and categories must be preserved, even if they must be
rethought, is provisional. It is entirely possible that the dynamic process
launched through a systematic rethinking will culminate in the forging
of new, better adapted concepts and categories. For now, however, any
such prediction would be mere speculation.

